INTRODUCTION
Recent advances in networked information technology have led to the emergence of a digital economy in which information goods are traded online by both human and computational agents. In these environments, a producer 1 of information goods is faced with a potentially daunting problem: how to position itself within a large and dynamic product space.
By their nature, digital goods can be easily bundled, unbundled, and re-bundled into different configurations. Rather than selling "a newspaper", a producer can sell the whole news collection, categories of articles, individual articles, graphics, data tables, etc. Low marginal cost and the easy configurability of digital information goods make unbundling and rebundling attractive, allowing a producer to precisely target consumers, at the expense of an exponential proliferation of possible product configurations.
Digital economies are also typically highly dynamic. Due to the large product space, a producer will typically need to search for good product configurations. In addition, both the presence of competing producers and nonstationarity in the consumer population can introduce secondary dynamics. This implies that a study of these systems must take into account not only their equilibria, but also potential nonequilibrium behavior while producers are learning.
In this paper, we consider the problem of competing information producers positioning their offerings when faced with a heterogeneous consumer population. We focus on the role that economic knowledge can play in reducing the producers' search burden. When producers must simultaneously learn what to offer and how to price it, the naive learning problem becomes very difficult. However, if producers use even a very limited amount of economic knowledge, they can sharply reduce the difficulty of each learning problem, locating a profitable niche and extracting a significant fraction of the equilibrium profit. This illustrates the importance of understanding the economic principles underlying an otherwise difficult multiagent learning problem.
ANALYTICAL RESULTS
We briefly summarize our model and present a summary of the theoretical conclusions that can be drawn from it. See [1] for a more complete exposition.
We assume that information goods each belong to exactly one of Γ categories, which can be arranged on a line in terms of similarity. We also assume that an individual consumer can be described by two parameters, k (the fraction of categories it values), and γ * (its favorite category). These parameters vary for each consumer. The consumer model also contains two parameters that remain fixed for the entire population: w (the valuation of articles in a consumer's favorite category), and λ (a parameter that governs the "clutter cost", or cost incurred by a consumer for each article it purchases). Each unique (γ, k) pair comprises a niche. Valuations for non-favorite categories fall off linearly, so that consumer j's value µj of an article in category γi is:
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The valuation of a bundle is then the sum of the values of all the articles in the bundle, less the clutter cost. Each producer will offer a bundle of length Γ + 1, consisting of the number of articles in each category, plus a price.
We assume that all niches are the same size, and that consumers are able to evaluate bundles before purchase, and act so as to maximize their surplus. The focus of this work is on the behavior of the producers: When should they compete directly, versus targeting separate niches? Can they learn preferable niches in the presence of uncertainty?
We first analyze the case of the monopolist. We show that the optimal offering for the monopolist results in two outermost niches receiving zero surplus. Given these two target niches, it is optimal for the monopolist to restrict itself to a subset of bundle distributions, i.e. percentages of total articles in each category. All of these distributions have the same "mean" category and all articles are "between" the two target niches. The profits from these distributions are a function only of bundle size. Thus, conditional on a pair of target niches, we can find the bundle size that maximizes profits. The problem of choosing the optimal offering thus reduces to finding the pair of target niches that, amongst all possible combinations of niches, results in the highest profits when optimally targeted. For duopoly producers, we characterize sufficient conditions for the existence of pure-strategy Nash equilibria. We show that in any equilibrium, the firms must earn equal profits. We further show that in any pure-strategy equilibrium, the firms do not compete for the same niches. The firms in our environment must thus both find the appropriate niches to target, and find the appropriate bundle and price combination to target these niches as a local monopolist.
EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
While the optimal strategy for full-information duopolist producers is for each to target a separate consumer niche, acting as a local monopolist, it is often the case that firms will not have complete information about the distribution of consumer preferences, nor about the economic structure of the problem. We conducted a series of experiments to study the robustness of these conclusions as the knowledge available to the producers was varied.
We modelled the learning of each producer using a genetic algorithm (GA) [2] . Each bundle was encoded as a gene. The fitness of a bundle is the profit that that bundle receives when it is offered to the consumer population. We refer to the set of bundles that a producer's GA is currently evaluating as its pool. Note that each producer is learning simultaneously; this means that each producer's target (the function it is optimizing) is potentially changing. One interpretation of this learning process is that each producer is learning a mixed strategy, represented by the elements of a producer's pool.
Our experiments used a population of 100 consumers, with k uniformly distributed in [0.2, 0.8] and |Γ = 9|. Each consumer's γ * is drawn from a uniform distribution, and all consumers have valuation w = 10 for their favorite category. This leads to an equilibrium in which each producer acts as a local monopolist, selling a bundle of 2 categories, with 113 articles in one category, 169 articles in the adjacent category, a price of 1286, and a theoretical profit of 36008. We conducted six experiments, summarized below. We also indicate the label given for each experiment in Figure 1 .
Zero-knowledge Producers were provided no knowledge of the consumer population. This provided a lower performance bound.
Tremble Producers were provided with complete information about the consumer population, as in section 2. Over time, the GA's mutation rate increased, introducing a "tremble" in which producers would occasionally take the wrong action. This experiment tested the stability of the equilibrium and served as an upper bound on performance.
Noise Producers had uncertainty over the consumer valuations (w), which meant that they no longer knew exactly how many articles to sell in each category. Noise+adjacency In addition to uncertainty over valuations, producers no longer knew which categories they should sell. Producers still had the economic knowledge that categories were arranged on a line, but not what their opponent would do. This identified the difficulty introduced by a second learning producer.
Number of categories
The next experiment removed the producer's knowledge that categories were arranged on a line. Producers still had the economic knowledge about consumers' k, which told them the number of categories to offer, but not the value relationship between adjacent categories.
Gradient
We increased the feedback available to the zeroknowledge producers by allowing them to observe the utility assigned to their bundle (rather than net profit) by the five highest-valuing consumers. This additional feedback about consumer preferences provides the producers with a more effective learning gradient.
We can see that the zero-knowledge learners perform quite poorly. However, producers perform significantly better once given even modest incomplete economic knowledge or gradient information. We show that duopolist information producers can avoid competition and maximize profits by targeting separate niches. We analytically characterize the conditions necessary to avoid direct competition, and experimentally identify economic knowledge needed for learning producers to discover this.
